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Abstract 
 
At the end of the American Civil War, political divisiveness, economic turmoil, 
and violence plagued the South. Riots occurred across the Reconstruction South, from 
New Orleans to Memphis. Though scholars have examined the causes of Reconstruction 
violence, this study examines the role of newspapers in promulgating fear, paranoia, and 
violence in Southern communities in the wake of the New Orleans Riot of 1866.  This 
thesis analyzes nine Louisiana newspapers to investigate whether newspapers published 
local and national rumors of violence or potential uprisings in the first three months after 
the riot. Though the rise of telegraphic news aided the rapid spread of information, it also 
enabled the pervasive circulation of rumors, gossip, and paranoia. Conservative 
newspapers often offered stories of mob activity, chaotic insurrections, and senseless 
violence, occurring within the state and in other regions of the South. The menace of 
Radical Republicanism appeared real to conservative editors, and publishing elaborate 
radical conspiracies, distorting the number of fatalities, and spreading rumors of 
instability seemed viable outlets for changing public opinion in favor of the Democratic 
Party.  
 
 
Key words: Reconstruction, Radical Republicanism, Louisiana, New Orleans Riot of 
1866 
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1 
I. Introduction 
The New Orleans Riot of 1866 and the Reconstruction South 
On July 30, 1866, white and black Louisianans gathered at the Mechanics’ 
Institute in downtown New Orleans to attend the state’s constitutional convention, which 
convened to discuss the contentious issue of extending suffrage to black men. While 
many Republicans supported the movement for black suffrage, white Democrats opposed 
granting black men the vote, insisting that “the loyal voters of the south are not yet 
prepared for political equality of the negro with the white man.”1 The convention drew a 
large crowd of both Republicans and Democrats eager to hear the outcome of the 
convention. Shortly after noon, a procession of 100 to 150 black people marched through 
the streets of New Orleans toward the Institute, excited about the possibility of universal 
suffrage. However, when words were exchanged between members of the procession, the 
police, and a nearby crowd of militant whites, the march turned deadly. A young white 
boy had begun taunting the black men, crying “Damned sons of bitches!”2 As the black 
men advanced toward the young boy, one of the police officers who had been surveying 
the scene from the corner of Canal and Dryades rushed to take the boy from the hostile 
confrontation. Then, the first shot rang through the crowd as one of the black men had 
pulled out his revolver and fired, sending the convention into a state of chaos. The whites 
on Canal “rushed up the street toward the institute,” and the black men of the procession 
retaliated, shouting insults and throwing bricks.3 Some white men carried bloody slug 
                                                          
1 Gilles Vandal, The New Orleans Riot of 1866: Anatomy of a Tragedy (Lafayette, La: Center for Louisiana 
Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1983), 112. 
2 James G. Hollandsworth, An Absolute Massacre: The New Orleans Race Riot of July 30, 1866 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 101. 
3 Hollandsworth, 101. 
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shots and boasted of their murderous street battle victories.4 The city policemen, who had 
quickly lost control of the scene, joined in the violence and attacked the Institute, firing 
indiscriminately upon those inside the main hall. Though blacks and whites attempted to 
defend themselves, the results of the riot were catastrophic. The day after the riot, the 
front page headline of the New Orleans Daily Crescent declared the massacre “A Terrible 
Day” for New Orleanians, and the official report of the riot affirms these sentiments.5 
The report lists 38 casualties and 146 wounded in the riot, with black participants 
suffering disproportionately from the massacre. Thirty-four of the 38 killed were black, 
as were 119 of the 146 wounded.6 
At the end of the American Civil War, political divisiveness, economic turmoil, 
and violence plagued the South. Michael Perman’s Reunion without Compromise: The 
South and Reconstruction, 1865-1868 shows that discord existed across the nation as the 
South reentered the Union. Federal troops occupied the South, and Confederate armies 
were disbanded. White southerners could no longer rely on slave labor for economic 
support, and the South’s agriculture suffered for the new expenses of waged 
employment.7 After formally surrendering their political power over the South and losing 
the backbone of their economy to emancipation, white southerners feared they had lost 
their autonomy, and they were subject to the will of the North. Reconciliation between 
the North and the South was difficult to accomplish, especially as the question of 
universal black suffrage loomed in the air.8 In the summer and fall of 1865, southern 
                                                          
4 Hollandsworth, 102. 
5 New Orleans Daily Crescent, July 31, 1866. 
6 Vandal, Anatomy of a Tragedy, 215-222. 
7 Michael Perman, Reunion without Compromise: The South and Reconstruction: 1865-1868 (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1973), 14. 
8 Perman, 82.  
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politicians waited expectantly for President Andrew Johnson to release his plans for 
restoring the South to the Union. Despite their recent defeat, white southerners 
maintained their defiance to Northern rule and staunchly opposed black enfranchisement. 
They warned that economic disorder and anarchy would occur if the North did not 
administrate the process of reunification with care and consideration of the South’s 
demands.9 
Though the New Orleans Massacre was not the first race riot to occur in the 
former Confederate states, it is notable for its political origins. Social and economic 
disturbances were familiar to the South prior to Reconstruction, but the New Orleans 
Massacre marked a transitional event, one where outbreaks of violence began to be based 
primarily on political grievances.10 Many historians, such as James G. Hollandsworth, 
George C. Rable, and Gilles Vandal have examined the causes and events of the New 
Orleans Massacre, but few scholars have attempted to uncover how large-scale political 
violence affected Southern communities.  
Recent historical scholarship has viewed the New Orleans Riot as an attempt of 
white southerners to disenfranchise and terrorize blacks during the early years of 
Reconstruction. In An Absolute Massacre: The New Orleans Race Riot of July 30, 1866, 
Hollandsworth provides a detailed narrative of the race riot, but he also analyzes the 
political and racial motives that compelled white southerners to retaliate against the 
supporters of the convention. Hollandsworth viewed the riot as a critical factor in 
establishing the “Solid South,” where white conservatives held the highest social status 
                                                          
9 Perman, 34-35. 
10 George C. Rable, But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1984), 43. 
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and blacks remained marginalized in their communities for years after slavery had been 
abolished.11 Historian James K. Hogue compared the riot to a type of “uncivil war,” 
where vigilantes, paramilitaries, and white supremacist militias in Louisiana used 
counterrevolutionary measures against the growing threat of black enfranchisement and a 
new egalitarian racial order. The riot was not an isolated event of sporadic violence, but it 
was a reaction to the social upheaval that accompanied the end of the war.  
Previous historical scholarship has examined the ways in which white southerners 
attempted to maintain economic, political, and social control over their communities after 
the war had ended. George C. Rable’s But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in 
the Politics of Reconstruction argues that conservatives in the South tried to retain white 
supremacy by spreading violence and terror throughout the former Confederate states. 
Rable uses several case studies of violent outbreaks from across the South to support his 
claim that white southerners used violence as a counterrevolutionary instrument against 
Federal Reconstruction policies. Rable’s findings have broader implications for those 
studying the social history of the South during Reconstruction.  In the wake of the 
Confederacy’s defeat, white southerners faced the loss of their economic livelihoods, 
racial dominance, and political power. Violence was one way in which white southerners 
could maintain their antebellum status in the post-war years.12 
 Stetson Kennedy arrives at a similar conclusion as Rable in After Appomattox: 
How the South Won the War. Like Rable, Kennedy argues that white southerners 
attempted to uphold the southern oligarchy of the antebellum period through violence and 
terror. However, Kennedy takes a different approach to his analysis of Reconstruction 
                                                          
11 Hollandsworth, 3. 
12 Rable, 187-89. 
5 
violence by comparing the social and racial inequalities that existed among the Old and 
New South. He concludes that the end of the Civil War did not result in immediate 
improvements in the political and social status of African Americans. Blacks were still 
subject to mob violence, lacked fair political representation, and found that they lacked 
many of the freedoms that a Union victory had promised.13 In the case of the New 
Orleans Riot, Louisianans who attempted to establish black male suffrage in the state 
were met with utter resistance from white conservatives, who retaliated against the 
changing status quo by sparking the mob violence of the New Orleans Riot.  
The Nineteenth-Century American Press 
 The New Orleans Massacre received both local and national attention, and the 
way in which newspapers interpreted the details of the riot, aftershocks of violence, and 
reports of social instability reveals how the public might have perceived the massacre in 
its aftermath. To appreciate the role of newspapers in spreading rumors of violence from 
one southern town to another, it is important to understand how news circulated among 
communities in the mid-nineteenth century, as well as how political biases operated in the 
press. The nineteenth-century was a period of rapid industrial and technological growth 
in the United States that marked the beginning of national news wire services. Menahem 
Blondheim’s News over the Wires: The Telegraph and the Flow of Public Information in 
America, 1844-1897 describes how the invention of the telegraph contributed to a 
centralized network of news gathering and distribution across the United States.14 Her 
most important conclusion, that the centralization of news networks integrated American 
                                                          
13 Stetson Kennedy, After Appomattox: How the South Won the War (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 1995), 57-59. 
14 Menahem Blondheim, News over the Wires: The Telegraph and the Flow of Public Information in 
America, 1844-1897 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
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society across the constraints of distance, is useful in understanding how the rapid spread 
of public information impacted the way communities received news of Reconstruction 
violence. 
With the development of the telegraph and the national news wire services, 
individuals began to use the new technology to further promote their specific political 
views. Mark Wahlgren Summers describes the connections between politicians and the 
press in the Reconstruction Era in The Press Gang: Newspapers and Politics, 1865-1878. 
According to Summers, partisan interests defined independent presses during 
Reconstruction, as political coverage provided much of the news and amusement for 
those of the time.15 Recognizing the power of the party press, politicians sought to shape 
public opinion by forming alliances with reporters who shared similar political interests. 
The dissemination of partisan news became a viable practice for journalists, 
especially with the development of party presses in the Civil War and Reconstruction 
periods. Republican papers allowed Unionists to spread their platform items across the 
Confederate states, even though their policies were not well received by the majority of 
white Southerners. 16  The press played a powerful role in spreading political dissent and 
controversial opinions to regions where they might not have otherwise been heard.  
The Post-war Spread of Fear, Paranoia, and Rumors 
 Fear and paranoia permeated the social atmosphere of the South, aided by the 
publications of party presses that spread rumors across communities. White conservatives 
feared emancipation and racial equality, and they worried that blacks were prepared to 
                                                          
15 Mark Wahlgren Summers, The Press Gang: Newspapers and Politics, 1865-1878 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 43-44. 
16 Richard H. Abbott, "Civil War Origins of the Southern Republican Press," Civil War History 43, no. 1 
(March 1997), 38-58. 
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wrest equality from whites through violent insurrections. These fears existed, and they 
present challenges to historians who wish to study rumors in past societies. 
In studying fear, paranoia, and rumor in historical scholarship, causality can be 
difficult to establish, and there is not always an overt link between a report of an 
insurrection and how seriously the community feared these reports. Despite these 
challenges, studying fear is not a hopeless endeavor, and several historians have provided 
useful frameworks for considering how to interpret rumors among primary sources. Mark 
Wahlgren Summers’s A Dangerous Stir: Fear, Paranoia, and the Making of 
Reconstruction examined newspaper reports of rumors and political cartoons to 
understand how paranoia shaped public political sentiment toward Federal 
Reconstruction.17 Rather than using rumor as evidence for events that may or may not 
have occurred, Summers uses rumor as a tool for interpreting the social atmosphere of the 
Reconstruction South. Summers’s work shows that no matter the motive behind reporting 
a rumor or perpetuating misinformation, those who spread such speculations had the 
potential to generate substantial fear in their communities. 
The “Christmas insurrection scare of 1865” demonstrates the ways in which 
rumors circulated across the South in the post-Civil War period. During the Christmas 
season following the end of the war, both black and white southerners believed that the 
Federal government would institute a major process of land redistribution, allocating 
former slaveholders’ land to their newly freed slaves. According to historian Steven 
Hahn, white Southerners feared that blacks would initiate a violent Christmas uprising if 
                                                          
17 Mark Wahlgren Summers, A Dangerous Stir: Fear, Paranoia, and the Making of Reconstruction (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina, 2009). 
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they did not receive the land they believed would be given to them.18 The spread of these 
rumors show the economic uncertainty that existed in the Reconstruction South, and they 
also reveal how blacks and whites used rumor to contend for control over local areas in 
their communities.    
 Hahn provides a valuable framework for studying rumors and fears in the 
Reconstruction South, one based upon the work of political scientist James C. Scott. In 
Domination and the Arts of Resistance, Scott studies the furtive political conduct of 
subordinate groups, such as the behaviors of slaves in the antebellum United States.19 He 
argues that the powerless of society create “hidden transcripts” to critique the dominant 
groups who hold power in society. These hidden transcripts can be expressed as rumors, 
gossip, folktales, songs, gestures, and jokes, among others. Scott argues that the hidden 
transcripts of subordinate groups provided a secretive framework within which the 
powerless could resist the authority of the empowered.20 The slaves of antebellum 
society, as well as the freed blacks of the Reconstruction Era, could use hidden 
transcripts, such as rumor and gossip, to fight covertly for power in their communities. 
The white conservatives of Louisiana did the same in the aftermath of the New Orleans 
Riot, but their transcripts did not need to be hidden. Rather, they were published for 
public consumption in the daily papers.   
 This study will use the work of Summers, Hahn, and Scott as a guide for 
investigating rumors in historical study. Rather than viewing the rumors published in 
                                                          
18 Steven Hahn, “’Extravagant Expectations' Of Freedom: Rumour, Political Struggle, and the Christmas 
Insurrection Scare Of 1865 in the American South," Past & Present, 1997, 151-52. 
19 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990). 
20 Scott, xii-xiii. 
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newspapers after the New Orleans Riot as factual evidence for events that occurred, this 
study will examine them as “hidden transcripts,” or ways in which one social group 
critiques the authority of another social group. In this particular study, the social groups 
who critique and the social groups who are critiqued will vary depending on the bias and 
intentions of the newspaper that published the rumor.  
The goal of this study is not to examine the motivations behind and the events of 
the New Orleans Riot of 1866; such topics have already been covered in length by 
previous Reconstruction scholars. Rather, this study uncovers how the riot and the 
Louisiana press affected the social atmosphere of New Orleans in its aftermath. Reports 
of insurrections or rumors of violence persisted in the city for months after the riot 
occurred and even spread across the state. By publishing such reports, newspapers 
contributed to the heightened level of social instability that existed in the wake of major 
Reconstruction riots. By building upon previous historical scholarship and using unique 
frameworks for analyzing rumor and fear, this research adds to a broader social history of 
the South during Reconstruction.  
 
  
10 
II. The Bloody Details 
In the aftermath of the riot, many Louisiana papers attempted to discern the events 
of the massacre and calculate the total number killed and wounded in the affair. The 
Shreveport South-western reported, “None regret the bloody details of yesterday more 
than we do – it was horrifying; but there seemed no alternative; fanaticism ruled for the 
day.”21 The “bloody details” of the New Orleans Massacre were staggering. The 
congressional record of the riot later listed 38 casualties and 146 wounded, but many 
Louisianans were uncertain of how many were killed or injured until that report was 
released in January of 1867.22 In the absence of a definitive answer regarding the human 
cost of the clash, rumors abounded as to how many individuals lost their lives on the 
streets of New Orleans that fateful day. As they speculated about the bloody details of the 
riot, newspapers were able to shape public perception of the affray.  
Uncertain of the actual number of fatalities, Louisiana papers circulated various 
estimates of the number killed in the New Orleans Riot, ranging from “two whites and 
several negroes” to around sixty.23 The count rose and fell as papers gleaned additional 
information over the wires. The July 31 issue of the Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Gazette & 
Comet declared that “upwards of fifteen persons” had been reported killed. Revealing the 
ongoing flux in the casualty figures, the Comet’s next issue printed an article published 
previously in the New Orleans Daily Crescent, stating that “so far as we have been 
informed, about thirty negroes were killed and several white persons were dangerously 
                                                          
21 South-western, August 8, 1866. 
22 Select Committee on New Orleans Riots, Report of the Select Committee on the New Orleans Riots, 39th 
Cong., 2d sess., 1867, H. Rep. 16, 25, 176. 
23 Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Gazette & Comet, July 31, 1866; South-western, August 1, 1866. 
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wounded.”24 Newspapers played a crucial role in conveying the violent extent of the New 
Orleans Massacre, despite not knowing the true magnitude of the riot themselves. Editors 
relied on telegraphic news from nearby cities, and the estimates of those killed varied 
considerably. For instance, the South-western published several telegrams in its August 1 
issue. While one telegram from Jackson reported that “the number of killed is estimated 
at 60 – all negroes,” a separate count from New Orleans painted a different picture. The 
New Orleans dispatch declared, “The casualties sum up; thirty negroes killed, and several 
whites, including a number of policemen, dangerously wounded.”25 The South-western 
resorted to publishing both conflicting reports, though readers could not be certain which 
report was true.  
Desperate to find some source of information about the riot, newspapers turned to 
one another to figure out how many lives were lost at the Mechanics’ Institute. 
Telegraphic news reported in the South-western was able to spread to other Louisiana 
papers as well, revealing the far reach of the rumors. The same telegrams reported in the 
August 1 issue of the South-western were published in August 4 issues of both the Semi-
Weekly Natchitoches Times and the Bellevue Bossier Banner. The Times and the Banner 
published the South-western’s article verbatim, but the Times’ piece featured the bold, 
incendiary headline, “Riot in New Orleans!! 60 Negroes Killed!”26 For the editors of the 
Times, the exaggerated count undoubtedly made for a more eye-catching headline, even if 
their article subsequently admitted that the casualty figures fell closer to thirty than sixty. 
Throughout August, papers continued to report rumors of the number killed and 
                                                          
24 Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Gazette & Comet, August 2, 1866. 
25 South-western, August 1, 1866. 
26 Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times, August 4, 1866; Bossier Banner, August 4, 1866. 
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wounded in the riot. However, the estimates of the fatalities declined dramatically from 
the South-western’s initial count of “60 – all negroes.”27 On August 8, the Semi-Weekly 
Natchitoches Times stated, “It is impossible yet to arrive at the exact number of casualties 
of the riot on Monday. Twenty-two deaths black and white, are all we can sum up. There 
were many wounded, and death may be the consequence in many of these cases.”28 
While acknowledging the impossibility of determining the actual casualty figures, the 
Times’ reported fatalities dwindled even further from the truth, demonstrating the 
instability of reports that circulated on the numbers of those killed and wounded. 
Over two weeks after the New Orleans Riot occurred, the Semi-Weekly 
Natchitoches Times continued to waver in its reports of fatalities resulting from the 
massacre. The Times’ numbers shifted again, this time escalating to an almost accurate 
count of forty casualties. On August 15, the Times featured a piece titled, “The 
Responsibility,” which purported that the riot “originated by two colored men of the mob 
firing on the police, and the rioters endeavoring to prevent the arrest of their comrades.”29 
The Times, proposing that the rioters were prepared for such an occasion, also claimed 
that their actions resulted in “the killing of forty men, and wounding of about one 
hundred and sixty.” While placing the casualties in the context of their own political 
leanings, the editors of the Times noted, “Among the number of killed, there was one 
policeman and a citizen; and among the wounded forty one policemen, and five 
citizens.”30 Their account pays special attention to the policeman and citizens killed in 
the riot, depicting them as victims of the rioters’ brutal actions. However, it glazes over 
                                                          
27 South-western, August 1, 1866. 
28 Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times, August 8, 1866. 
29 Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times, August 15, 1866. 
30 Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times, August 15, 1866. 
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the overwhelming loss of life that affected the black population. In actuality, thirty-four 
of the 38 killed were black, as were a majority of the wounded.31 
In the same August 15 issue, the Times printed a statement issued by Lieutenant 
Governor Albert Voorhies, Attorney General A.S. Herron, and New Orleans Mayor John 
T. Monroe that outlined their views of the riot and provided yet another estimate of the 
casualties. Notably, the numbers of those killed and wounded were presented in a 
different manner than in the previous piece. The men contended that “forty-two 
policemen and several citizens were either killed or wounded by them [the rioters]” and 
“twenty-seven rioters were killed and a considerable number wounded.”32 By combining 
the numbers of the killed and wounded policemen and citizens, Voorhies, Herron, and 
Monroe made the non-rioters appear as the real victims of the New Orleans Massacre, the 
ones who suffered considerable loss of life. Their estimates also undercount the true 
casualty figures for the black population. The men’s ambiguous wording and erroneous 
approximations left room for a range of misguided interpretations as to what actually 
occurred at the New Orleans Riot. 
When conservative papers like the Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times reported the 
deaths of African Americans, who were seen as the conspirators of the riot, they were 
often minimized in comparison to the deaths of white policemen. On the day after the 
New Orleans Massacre, the New Orleans Bee reported, “Twenty-two policemen were 
wounded, of whom we obtained the following names: Theard, McDonnelly, Hennessy 
and Sokoloski. The two latter are not expected to live. Police officer Waggaman is dead. 
Corpl. Barnell, police officer, is also dead. We could not learn the total casualties among 
                                                          
31 Vandal, Anatomy of a Tragedy, 215-222. 
32 Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times, August 15, 1866. 
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the negroes, but we can safely say there was not less than 25 killed outright. Four dray 
loads were carried off from the Mechanics’ Institute.”33 The Bee identifies the names of 
the officers who were wounded and killed in the affray, but they describe the deaths of 
the black population in terms of how many carts it took to move the bodies.  
Like the New Orleans Bee, the South-western and the Bossier Banner devoted 
more consideration to identifying the white policemen and citizens who were harmed 
than identifying the blacks who were wounded and killed in the riot. On August 8, the 
South-western published an account of the riot that had originally appeared in the Times-
Picayune of New Orleans. The article reveals the different attentions that were accorded 
to the white and black peoples involved in the massacre. It reads: 
In our present report we will not endeavor to give a list of the names of the 
negroes who were wounded or arrested. At the first district there were upwards of 
one hundred and fifty or two hundred taken. At the second district station fifty-
three were received. Three died after being brought to the station, and three others 
are supposed to be mortally wounded. In all, I suppose there has been about fifty 
negroes killed…Officer Sokoloski, a well-known and faithful officer, received a 
ball in the groin, and is not expected to recover. Officer James Henry is also said 
to be mortally wounded…A son of Dr. Cenas, a medical student…received a shot 
in the neck from one of the windows in the Hall, and expired immediately. He had 
nothing to do with the battle then raging.34 
The number of black casualties is once again erroneous, but the more striking 
aspect of the report is the disparate treatment of the killed, wounded, and arrested among 
                                                          
33 New Orleans Bee, July 31, 1866. 
34 South-western, August 8, 1866. 
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the races.   The paper does not attempt to identify any blacks who lost their lives in the 
riot, opting instead to describe them only in terms of their sheer number. However, the 
piece does provide an extensive list of the whites who were killed, wounded, and 
arrested. The account identifies the officers by name, and even the innocent bystander is 
recognized as “a son of Dr. Cenas, a medical student.”35 A few days later, the Bossier 
Banner reprinted the article from the South-western, revealing how other papers received 
and transmitted these supposed facts of the New Orleans Massacre. 
The Alexandria Louisiana Democrat also spread rough estimations of the casualty 
figures that did not adequately or accurately capture the true extent of the violence. The 
August 8 issue of the Democrat offered “such particulars of the affair as our corps of 
reporters was able to glean” and provided a more dramatic account of the massacre. 
Though the article had acknowledged that the riot was “attended by more loss of life and 
maiming of body than any similar occurrence in this history of New Orleans,” it could 
only ascertain that “over twenty dead men lay in the street about 3 o’clock when we left 
this calamity.”36 The Democrat did not mention the casualty figures again until a month 
later, when they provided a brief update of the fatality count. Publishing a succinct 
summary of the official report from the military authorities of New Orleans, the 
Democrat stated only that there were “38 killed, 48 severely wounded, and 98 slightly 
wounded.” Though this was more accurate than the Democrat’s past report, their 
numbers still failed to recognize the impact of the riot on the black population.  As in the 
case of the Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times, the ambiguity allowed room for various 
                                                          
35 South-western, August 8, 1866. 
36 Louisiana Democrat, August 8, 1866. 
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interpretations of the New Orleans Riot, and papers possessed the power to report the 
fatalities in a way that suited their political framework.  
Some conservative papers, like the New Orleans Daily Crescent, realized that 
blacks had borne the brunt of the violence. Still, they framed the reports of those killed 
and wounded in ways that portrayed blacks as utterly inferior to whites. On July 31, the 
paper published a piece titled, “A Terrible Day,” mourning the riot’s overwhelming 
casualties while interjecting their social commentary. The Crescent declared, “Some 
twenty or thirty negroes were killed in this encounter. The universal expression of 
sentiment was that of regret that the poor negro, who was incited to demonstrations of 
violence, was the victim of the contest, while the white man, who had inflamed him, 
escaped. Nevertheless, a few of those who seemed to love incendiarism, met their fate.”37 
After presenting a brief glimpse of the casualties among the blacks who had been present 
at the Convention, the Crescent added their own political twist to the massacre.  In their 
version of the events, the riot began when “white men, standing on the steps of the State 
House, exhorted the negroes to kill every white person – man, woman or child – who 
interfered with them.”38 As soon as the day after the riot, Louisiana papers like the 
Crescent recognized that blacks were the ones who ultimately suffered in the massacre. 
However, the paper’s portrayal of blacks as those who helplessly succumbed to the 
urgings of white leaders and wrought chaos upon the city reveals the way in which they 
perceived the disparity in power among the races. From the Crescent’s perspective, the 
blacks were powerless to the whims of white citizens, and if incited, would risk their own 
lives to commit radical acts of violence.  
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Like the Crescent, the West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter used its reports of the 
numbers killed and wounded to depict the black victims as inferior and powerless. 
Declaring that its readers “must be in possession of all the particulars of the great riot in 
New Orleans on Monday last,” the Planter refrained from publishing a report on the riot 
or providing an exact count of the number they believed to be killed or wounded. Rather, 
its editors offered a sentiment comparable to the one made by the Crescent, stating, “For 
the negroes who fell victims to the wiles of the Conventionists, we have but one feeling 
which is shared, in by a large majority of our friends – and that is sorrow. We saw several 
killed during the riot, but not until the command to surrender had been repeatedly given. 
Poor, deluded people! They were made to suffer for the sins of those who pretended to be 
their friends…”39 The Planter’s account portrayed the blacks who lost their lives as 
victims of their own delusions who suffered because of their weak-willed nature. 
In the days and weeks after the New Orleans Massacre, Louisiana newspapers 
were vital sources of intelligence for those seeking to understand the particulars of the 
riot. However, information varied considerably among the papers, and the rapid spread of 
speculative casualty figures shows the uncertainty that characterized the state in the riot’s 
aftermath. No matter which paper they read, Louisianans were unable to determine the 
true scope of the massacre. An unfortunate consequence of such speculative reporting 
was that the blacks who lost their lives at the Mechanics’ Institute were often described 
as nameless casualties, their deaths serving as political fodder for shaping public 
perception of the New Orleans Riot. For many conservative papers, their deaths were 
“bloody details,” and nothing more.  
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III. “Excitement Should Be Avoided”: Rumors of Riots, Violence, and Insurrections 
Rumors of Violence within New Orleans 
Police records published in the New Orleans Daily Crescent reveal the heightened 
levels of fear, paranoia, and violence across the city in the wake of the riot. A front-page 
column in the August 2 issue of the Crescent contains several rumors of uprisings within 
the city, including an allegation that “a large number of negroes from the west side of the 
river had crossed below the Third District, and were crossing to attack the white 
population.” 40 A different rumor led to the arrest of Boyd Robinson, who was charged 
with “inciting negroes on the levee to attack white persons.” 41 The same piece warned of 
another riot, this one reported by an officer, Lieutenant William H. Manning. Manning 
telegraphed the Chief of Police there was “every expectation of a riot on Main street, 
between Royal and Bourbon streets” that evening.42   
The rumored insurrections fizzled. The Second District police reported that the 
rumor that blacks were attempting to attack the whites was “officially found to be 
untrue.”43 Robinson was brought before the District’s recorder and soon discharged for 
reasons that remained unclear. As to the riot on Main Street, Manning ordered his men to 
guard the scene but later telegraphed the chief, “Everything quiet. No prospect of any 
disturbance.”44  
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Much like the Crescent, the West Baton Rouge Parish Sugar Planter was quick to 
spread rumors. The weekly paper promoted the parish’s economic development while 
condemning Radical Republicanism. The Planter published two conflicting opinions on 
the condition of New Orleans in their August 11 issue. In one article, the paper alleges 
that, “Rumor, with her multitude of tongues, says the Convention will meet nolens volens 
on the 3rd of September next, but whether the Radical Wells will have stamina enough to 
carry his threat into execution remains to be seen.”45 On the same page, the Planter offers 
another story, this one from the New Orleans Times: “The rumors which fly thick and fast 
through the streets, of riots and uprisings in and around New Orleans, says the Times, are 
all unfounded, and the offspring of heated imagination – so we are informed by the Chief 
of Police.” Without knowing the certainties of the riot, or whether or not a major 
outbreak of violence might occur again, the Sugar Planter resorted to publishing rumors, 
though they claimed that they understood “the true position of affairs” in New Orleans. 46 
While these incidents might have been causes for authentic concern for the New 
Orleans police, they reveal something else about the social atmosphere in the city at the 
time. Groundless or not, paranoia still seeped through the public mind and was reflected 
in the reports of local newspapers. In his book, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 
political scientist James C. Scott describes the idea that rumors thrive “in situations in 
which events of vital importance to people’s interests are occurring and in which no 
reliable information – or only ambiguous information – is available.”47 By reporting 
these rumors in spite of their speculative nature, the Crescent was able to spread 
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politically charged news rapidly, even if such news was vague or fallacious. Truth was 
not a prerequisite for publication in a Louisiana paper.  
Few pieces of intelligence were relayed with absolute certainty in the Louisiana 
press, but what wound up in the local papers reveals much about how journalists 
perceived the social instability that existed in the wake of the riot. A report published by 
the Crescent demonstrates the prevailing paranoia that blacks were preparing to launch an 
attack on the local population. On the evening of August 2, a discharged United States 
soldier alerted an officer of the Third District police of “a gathering of about two hundred 
armed negroes assembled some two miles below the barracks.”48 Lieutenant Joseph 
Jacobs, head of the Third District police, sent a patrol to where the crowd was rumored to 
have assembled to determine the veracity of the soldier’s statement. According to the 
report published by the Crescent the following day, “nothing additional had been heard 
from Lieut. Jacobs in relation to the matter.”49 Though the actual presence of the 
gathering was not confirmed, it still garnered attention from the local press.  
At the same time that the Crescent was publishing rumors of insurrections in their 
daily papers, they maintained a firm stance against those who sought to spur outbreaks of 
violence. In an article titled, “Excitement Should Be Avoided,” an unknown journalist 
expresses concern that “fierce instincts have been incited, dormant passions have been 
aroused, latent enmities have been developed, and ancient grudges have been revived” 
among local black men and women as a direct result of the New Orleans Riot.50 The 
                                                          
48 New Orleans Daily Crescent, August 3, 1866. 
49 New Orleans Daily Crescent, August 3, 1866. Lieutenant Jacobs’s full name is not found in the Crescent, 
but it is retrieved from Hollandsworth’s An Absolute Massacre, 113. 
50 New Orleans Daily Crescent, August 3, 1866. 
21 
article charges the “worst of [the city’s] whites” with teaching and rousing blacks to “take 
an initiatory step in such a revolution as must wholly change the fundamental 
organization of society, and lead through horrible crimes to the destruction of all that is 
valuable in our government.”51  The Crescent’s dramatic flair does not come as a 
surprise. As Mark Wahlgren Summers notes in The Press Gang: Newspapers and 
Politics, 1865-1877, Southern journalists in the Reconstruction Era often wrote with 
language that was “truculent and apocalyptic,” in order to suit their partisan 
perspective.52 The writing of the Crescent falls in line with Summers’ statement. The 
conservative author displays a hostile attitude toward the Radical Republicans who 
incited the riot, insisting that they will be the cause of civil government’s demise. The 
Crescent also cautions its readership, which one can presume included few radicals, that 
insurrectionary actions of Radical Republicans presented a serious threat to the safety of 
the city, its businesses, and its residents. Therefore, the “thinking and calm” citizens of 
New Orleans were responsible for assuaging the agitators of public peace and stopping 
the spread of evil influences within the city.53  
Despite warning for “excitement to be avoided,” the Crescent itself did little 
lessen public excitement in the weeks after the New Orleans Riot. 54 The paper continued 
to publish stories of street disturbances, mob activity, and indiscriminate violence against 
local citizens and policemen. On August 16, the front page of the Crescent reported that 
“four negro soldiers armed with muskets threatened to kill Mr. Palegau,” who was the 
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owner of a grocery store on the corner of Derbigny and Conti Street, a few blocks from 
the Mechanics’ Institute, where the New Orleans Massacre had occurred almost four 
weeks before. Palegau was not the only one purported to be in harm’s way. The 
unidentified soldiers stood in front of his store, “threaten[ing] the lives of officer Cook 
and several private citizens, present.”55 Shots were not fired, and the soldiers fled before 
they could be arrested. The Crescent’s account does not include any other details 
surrounding the violent incident, including the motive behind it. Whether the editors at 
the Crescent did not know the reason for the intimidation, or desired to depict it as a 
senseless act, is impossible to determine.  
Again and again, the Crescent returned to reports of black soldiers organizing 
against local citizens, especially those who were also members of the police. Almost two 
months after the riot, an article in the Crescent bore the rousing headline, “Negroes 
Shooting and Cutting the Police,” depicting two stories of reckless shootings and 
rebellious behavior. Shortly after midnight on September 23, a band of black soldiers, 
allegedly representing the 9th United States Colored Cavalry, attacked the police at the 
intersection of Conti and Treme. Despite firing several shots at the police, “none of the 
shots took effect,” and the soldiers soon bolted the scene. However, they did not evade 
capture. The men were arrested on Bienville Street and later charged with attempted 
murder. The Crescent notes that the men were found with the “new revolvers” they had 
used against the police.56 Again, the Crescent does not provide a motive for these men’s 
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actions. Instead, it depicts the affair as one in which armed black soldiers assaulted 
innocent policemen at random and without reason.   
The second story reported in the Crescent article also tells of irrational violence 
against the police. In the early hours of a Friday morning, “a negro ball on Franklin 
street, between Customhouse and Canal streets, was closed by the police for the 
disorderly behavior of the people in it, the men amusing themselves by going on the 
street and firing pistols.” In retaliation against the police who had shut down the ball, 
Robert Mac, a black man attending the party, cut one of the officers with a razor. Mac 
was soon arrested, but not before he let the police know that “he was a soldier.”57  
In September, the paper published an article titled, “Negro Riot,” a headline 
reminiscent of the reports following the July 30 massacre. According to the article, the 
episode began when two police officers arrested two black prostitutes near Corduroy 
Alley, a “neighborhood [that] is filled with lewd negresses, and is much resorted to by 
discharged negro soldiers, and blacks still in service.” The situation escalated when the 
local blacks, supposedly a mob of several hundred, staged their own rescue of the two 
female prisoners by heaving bricks and stones at the arresting officers. Additional forces 
arrived to assist the policemen in the arrest, and “the combined forces made a 
demonstration which dispersed the mob without resort to violent measures.” However, 
the article claims that the mob succeeded in injuring the arresting officers, who were 
“very roughly used” after the incident. The report alleges that the black men throttled and 
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knocked the officers down, and “the women bit them severely, to force them to relinquish 
their hold” on the prostitutes.58  
Though this riot resulted in relative peace, it reveals the concern among some 
New Orleans papers that the presence of armed black men in certain neighborhoods 
contributed to the outbreak of mob violence. On October 1, the Crescent published news 
of a separate incident where “a large crowd of negroes were disturbing the peace, at the 
corner of Barracks and Treme streets.” One member of the mob, a man named Joseph 
Manuel, was arrested for having a musket in his possession and was charged with an 
attempt to kill. Like other Crescent reports of riots and violent outbreaks, the article fails 
to mention whether or not the arrested party was convicted. Rather, it tells a hollow, oft-
repeated story of armed black men rioting on the streets of the city without an apparent 
motive or cause. 
The Crescent was not the only paper to publish on the condition of New Orleans 
in the aftermath the riot. Newspapers located in towns across the state often reported 
about affairs in the city. Many papers, like the Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times and the 
Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Gazette & Comet, insisted that the city was peaceful and that 
rumors surrounding the outbreaks of violence in New Orleans were untrue, aside from a 
few minor provocations that occurred among the people.  
One week after the New Orleans Riot, the Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times 
published a thorough account on the “State of the City and Results of the Conflict.” 
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While asserting that “there has been no disturbance of public tranquility” among New 
Orleanians, the account also tells of several incidents that occurred since the riot: 
On Common street, on Monday evening, an infuriated negro assailed an elderly 
Irish woman. She wrenched his club from him, and held him at bay until a white 
man came to her assistance and prostrated him… The negroes were talking of 
holding a meeting in their church on St. Paul street last evening to concert 
measures for taking vengeance on the white people. The more discreet of the 
colored population were advising against the meeting, and we believe it was not 
held… A lot of negroes living in a house on Victory street, between Enghien and 
Poet streets, shot at several citizens passing on the street…Acting Corporal 
Brooks reports that four negroes, armed with revolvers, formed themselves in a 
line on Claiborne street, about twelve o’clock, and prevented all white persons 
from passing…Sergeant Adams reports that a squad of the eighty-first colored 
infantry broke open a store on the corner of Poyfarre and Annunciations streets 
and carried off with three revolvers and a shot gun.59 
Though their account indicates otherwise, the Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times stood by 
their belief that “the people both white and black are setting down to a peaceful 
condition.”60  
The Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times shared this conviction with other 
Democratic papers, like the Baton Rouge Tri-Weekly Gazette & Comet. Echoing the 
Times’ statement, the Comet reported that “the late civil commotion has been so 
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thoroughly quieted down, as no longer to necessitate a continuance of absolute military 
law.”61  In his book, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877, historian Joe Gray Taylor 
argues that this was a somewhat common pattern among other Louisiana papers. 
Especially in the initial weeks after the riot, some Louisiana papers “preferred, if 
possible, to play down the riot, even though it led to what amounted to martial law in 
New Orleans.”62 By claiming that there was peace within the city, papers like the Times 
and the Comet held a certain level of authority over the Radical Republicans who had 
supposedly incited the riot. In the eyes of Democratic papers, the Radicals attempt to 
usurp authority was unsuccessful, and the peaceful state of the city was sure proof of their 
failure. 
In the days, weeks, and months following the New Orleans Riot, Louisiana papers 
took several tacks to reporting on the state of the city. While some overestimated the 
level of mob violence occurring on the streets, others downplayed the rumors of bedlam 
and insisted that the city was at peace once more.  
Rumors of Violence across the South 
Aside from reporting on the condition of New Orleans after the riot, conservative 
editors filled their papers with reports of mob violence occurring in other places across 
the United States.  None gained as much traction in the Louisiana press as the New 
Orleans Riot, but each rumor of insurrection still generated provocative headlines among 
the daily papers. 
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In late September 1866, the New Orleans Daily Crescent published a report from 
the Pensacola Observer that described a clash between Tallahassee police officers who 
had attempted to arrest a black man. Following his arrest, a large crowd of blacks 
attempted to wrest the prisoner from the policemen with little success. Later that evening, 
the group gathered once more at the courthouse, this time armed with loaded guns and 
pistols. They fired one shot before fleeing the scene. No one was seriously injured; 
however, the report mentioned that a bullet passed through the skirt of a female 
bystander.63 
In October, news of an insurrection made its way into the pages of the South-
western, the New Orleans Daily Crescent, and the Opelousas Courier. The South-western 
described a “serious disturbance” at Cat Island, Arkansas, located only twenty-five miles 
below Memphis, a city itself fraught with intense racial violence just five months 
earlier.64 According to the dispatch, fifty blacks armed themselves to launch a mass 
uprising against the local whites. A skirmish erupted when black men fired their 
revolvers at two white men. In the ensuing melee, two black men were killed, and three 
others were wounded. The ones supposed to incite the rebellion then scattered, and the 
whites reportedly “armed themselves and went in pursuit” of the leaders of the affray.65 
The New Orleans Daily Crescent and the Opelousas Courier engaged in more 
rabble-rousing versions of the affair. While the South-western deemed the events at Cat 
Island a mere disturbance, the Crescent and the Courier opened with the provocative 
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headline, “Negro Insurrection.”66 The Crescent published a detailed account of the 
uprising reprinted from the Memphis Avalanche. According to the Crescent, after 
obtaining gunpowder, rifles, and ammunition from a local trading boat, several black men 
employed at a local plantation planned an attack on the white men who lived and worked 
nearby. Not only does the Crescent’s version include an account of the ensuing conflict, 
it also offers an examination of the origin and motives behind the attack.  The black men, 
acting under direction from white men in Memphis, intended to seize the plantations and 
murder those who stood in their way. The men involved were instruments of a larger 
scheme, one where the black population sought to become their own rulers in society, 
rather than being subject to the whims of white leaders.67 To the Avalanche, as well as 
the Crescent, the events at Cat Island signaled disastrous consequences for Southern 
society. The article closed with a disconcerting question for white Southerners: “Who 
could tell where it would end, had it [the riot] been successful in the beginning?”68 By 
presenting incendiary versions of the Cat Island affair, the Crescent and the Courier had 
the potential to generate greater paranoia surrounding rumored outbreaks of violence in 
the South.   
The Courier offered a similar report as the one published in the Crescent but 
added their particular partisan spin on the matter. The article stated that fifty or sixty 
black men, deciding that they would no longer work on a nearby plantation, took up arms 
with a pledge to kill the first white person who crossed their path. When the armed men 
met the owners of the plantation at which they worked, they instigated the brutal conflict 
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described in the South-western. The Courier claimed the Cat Island riot was an 
unsurprising consequence of radical republican teachings, calling it, “one of the many 
acts of barbarism which the poor, uneducated negro, bolstered up to think that he is the 
equal of the white men, is led to do by others, when if he was in his proper position, 
would never dream of committing such atrocities.”69 The articles published in the 
Courier and the Crescent serve as yet another reminder of the political motivations that 
influenced which stories were modified, embellished, and put into circulation. 
Conservative southern papers used these outbreaks to undercut the legitimacy of 
the new political and racial order. There was scant information available to the presses 
about the truths of the riot and its aftermath, but each paper molded the news that they 
had acquired to reflect their partisan interests and accomplish certain goals.  Regarding 
this rapid circulation of fabricated stories among Southern papers after the New Orleans 
Riot, Summers comments “Facts were inconvenient things.”70 In the case of many 
Democratic presses, they were seldom necessary to sell a paper. 
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IV. A Radical Plot 
  On August 4, the New Orleans Daily Crescent published a piece titled, “The 
Spirit of Our People,” describing the incendiary atmosphere in the city in the wake of the 
riot. The article also reveals a common sentiment among conservative papers who 
reported on the massacre. In its opening sentence, the author declared, “From indications 
already made apparent, it is certain that the radicals and their backers in this city will try 
to make it appear that the riots of Monday last were the outbreak of a fanatical hatred 
against the negro race.”71 To the Crescent, this was an inaccurate rendering of events. 
The paper insisted that the riot was not racially motivated but began when “law-abiding 
people” attempted to stop the actions of “a set of unprincipled, ambitious and vindictive 
schemers, who were plotting to subvert the State authorities, and to seize possession of 
the government by means which in all communities would be recognized as revolutionary 
and treasonable.”72 According to the Crescent, the riot was not a matter of escalated 
racial tensions, but it was the beginning of the radicals’ elaborate plot to take over the 
South. 
In the weeks after the riot, conservative editors like those at the Crescent changed 
the public conversation regarding the New Orleans Massacre. In their words, it was 
undeniable that the radicals planned the event as part of their grand scheme to claim 
control of the government. Instead of viewing the riot as a tragedy, Democratic 
newspapers turned it into yet another reason to publicly condemn the insurrectionary 
Radical Republicans. Historian Mark Wahlgren Summers describes this phenomenon in 
his book, A Dangerous Stir: Fear, Paranoia, and the Making of Reconstruction. 
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According to Summers, southern editors insisted that the radicals who incited the New 
Orleans Riot had acted under the instruction of the Republicans on Capitol Hill.73 Despite 
mounting evidence to the contrary, “the allegation that Republican leaders had approved 
of the convention in advance, or even ordered it, had become a staple of Democratic 
reporting.”74 Conservative papers, like the Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times, the South-
western, and the Louisiana Democrat, among others, circulated the rumor that there was 
“a Radical plot to disfranchise white ex-Confederates, enfranchise blacks, and without 
taking a vote of the people in Louisiana, bring the state into the Union under its new, 
bogus constitution.”75 
The Semi-Weekly Natchitoches Times was a strong proponent of the radical 
conspiracy in the weeks following the New Orleans Massacre. On August 4, the Semi-
Weekly Natchitoches Times expressed their fear that in the wake of the riot the “lately 
emancipated slaves” would receive the right to vote under the leadership of the 
Radicals.76 In one article, the Times exclaimed, “From the speeches lately uttered in 
public meetings, in New Orleans, it is evident that the Radical leaders are determined to 
carry their intentions into effect, even if it involve the State in anarchy and blood. Let the 
Conservative element of the country act in harmony, and act with vigor, in a crisis so 
alarming.”77 To the editors at the Times, it was shocking that the Radical Republicans, so 
determined to obtain suffrage for African Americans, had been willing to risk innocent 
lives to fulfill their grand scheme. While chaos and violence ran rampant under 
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Republican influence, Louisiana’s Democrats were charged with returning peace to the 
state. 
 In their next issue, the Times expounded upon the perceived radical plot to 
overthrow the State government and denounced the Convention’s instigators. On August 
8, the Times printed a lengthy account of the New Orleans riot, which included their 
blatant condemnation of Radical Republican politicians and their disappointment that the 
black men of the city would follow their leadership: 
It seems, from the testimony of the leading colored members of the 
convention, that great preparation had been made by the white leaders of 
the riot, to have the negroes armed and how they should commence the 
scene for bloodshed and plunder. It is strange that men who profess to be 
good and honest citizens should embrace such a suicidal hallucination, as 
to inaugurate a war of races to perpetuate their passionate and unpolitic 
fanatical theories. It seems almost impossible that men with healthy 
conscience and sound intellect should allow themselves to be carried into 
the current of a Radical stream of unpopularity, and adhere to a party of 
broken down politicians and disappointed and demented fanatics, who are 
attempting to overthrow the government and scatter their schemes of 
discord and riot in every parish of the state.78 
After blaming the Convention members for falling prey to the wiles of Radical 
Republicans, the Times argued that the riot was part of a larger conspiracy, one that 
sought to incite violence across the state and to take over Louisiana’s government. One 
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week later, on August 15, the Times reported, “The origin of this affair must be traced to 
an understanding between the Radical members of Congress, on the one hand, and on the 
other, the Governor and other waifs of the Banks Government at New Orleans. In their 
programme the main object was to subvert the State Government in order to inaugurate 
on which would hold communion with the rump Congress...”79 The paper also issued a 
warning to its readers: “the people of this State, must be ready to witness a renewed and 
perhaps more bloody attempt on the part of the anarchists to revolutionize our State 
Government.”80 The Times insisted that the New Orleans Riot was not an isolated event; 
it was the beginning of a large-scale rebellion that the Radical Republicans in Congress 
had furtively planned. 
 To the Times, the New Orleans Riot heralded a great crisis in the nation’s history. 
In an August 19 article, aptly titled “The Conspiracy,” the Times claimed, “It is useless to 
conceal the fact, that this very day, there is on foot within the limits of the State, a 
reckless conspiracy to subvert our State and Municipal Governments – a conspiracy 
which is clothed with peril, since it forms a link of the great conspiracy, by which 
radicalism contemplates the overthrow of the General Government.” Just as the Times 
reported in previous issues, the article insisted that the New Orleans Riot was proof that a 
greater plot existed to bring the civil government under strict Republican leadership, and 
they believed that radicals were working within the city “to plunge the State in another 
revolution.81 
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 In the eyes of many Louisiana newspaper editors, the New Orleans Massacre 
offered yet another opportunity to express contempt of Radical Republicanism and to 
intensify the growing paranoia that a larger rebellion might occur in the state. Just five 
days after the riot, the Sugar Planter published their speculations on the cause of the 
massacre. On August 4, its editors declared, “It is clear to every unbiased mind that this 
riot was a premeditated affair on the part of the Conventionists who desired political, or 
other martyrdom, that the Radical party of Congress might recover their arbitrary sway 
over Louisiana.”82 The Planter claimed with certainty that the Conventionists had 
planned to provoke the violent massacre in a futile attempt to gain control of the state’s 
government. Though the Planter presented this as fact, there was room for doubt in their 
version of the events. As Summers demonstrated in A Dangerous Stir, many members of 
the Convention arrived to the Mechanic’s Institute unarmed, and “the proposition that 
delegates would show up unarmed to be slaughtered for a good Republican sensation” 
was implausible.83 
 In a later issue, the Planter insisted that the “radical throats of the North” were 
responsible for inciting the riot. On August 11, the Planter claimed that “this riot was a 
god-send to them [the radicals] – they concocted the whole scheme at home – sent their 
agents South to carry it into effect – succeeded most admirably at the expense of human 
life – and covered with the blood of their slaughtered friends, proclaim them martyrs in a 
holy cause.”84 The northern Republicans had engineered the riot, at the expense of the 
Conventionists, to promote the cause of black suffrage and equality in the South.  
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 The editors at the Planter were not the only ones to purport the conspiracy that 
Radicals in the North were ultimately responsible for the riot. Others papers, such as the 
Louisiana Democrat, insinuated that Northern radicals had instigated the New Orleans 
Massacre for their own political gain. On August 22, the Democrat published an article 
with the headline, “The New Orleans Riot – The Radical Game, the Impeachment of 
President Johnson.” The piece stated, “The baffled radicals have evidently resolved upon 
a system of bold and desperate expedients for the instigation of mobs and riots in the 
South, whereby to maintain their ascendancy among the Union war elements of the 
North. Southern rebel mobs and riots against Yankees, Southern white Unionists and 
negroes are the very things now most urgently required and desired by Northern radicals 
for their electioneering purposes.”85 Just like the Sugar Planter, the Democrat twisted the 
story of the New Orleans Massacre into a denunciation of the Radical Republicans who 
supposedly sought to use it as political fodder. 
 Aside from postulating that Northern Republicans had sparked the New Orleans 
Massacre, the Democrat also surmised what would happen to the South if the Radicals 
gained political leadership of the country. On September 26, the Democrat warned its 
readers that if the Radicals won the elections, “The intense hate which the Radicals have 
been treasuring up against the Southern people for the last five years, would then burst 
out in all its fury…We have recently had an example of what the people of Louisiana 
may expect, and our State will afford a fair specimen of the condition of the rest of her 
sisters.” The Democrat insisted that if the Radicals took charge of the government, 
Governor Wells and his co-conspirators would be able to accomplish what the New 
                                                          
85 Louisiana Democrat, August 22, 1866. 
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Orleans Riot had supposedly intended, which was to “adopt the Constitutional 
amendment disfranchising nineteenth twentieths of the people of the State” and provide 
for black enfranchisement.86 
 The Shreveport South-western reported extensively on the “radical conspiracy” 
and took a particular interest in criticizing Governor Wells’s role in the New Orleans 
Riot. In an August 15 issue, the South-western printed the article, “Governor Wells 
Defines His Position.” The piece condemned Wells for defending “the revolutionary 
schemers who attempted to overturn the State government and set up in its place a 
rampant radical cabal composed of fanatics and incendiaries.”87 Not only this, the report 
featured a dispatch from the New Orleans Times, another conservative paper, that 
criticized the actions of Governor Wells, Convention leader R. King Cutler, and the other 
radicals involved in the New Orleans Riot. According to the Times, “R. King Cutler is 
anxious to disfranchise the white citizens of the state, and enfranchise the negroes. Filled 
with the prejudice of party, the governor sees in the efforts of our municipal authorities to 
preserve the peace only a desire to bring on a collision and redden our streets with 
blood!”88 
 On August 22, the South-western attempted to defend President Andrew Johnson, 
who had faced political attacks from Republicans after stating that the New Orleans Riot 
originated in the radical Congress.89 In addition to defending Johnson, the South-western 
published an excerpt from the Washington Intelligencer that aligns with Johnson’s view 
on the radical conspiracy. The Intelligencer claimed, “It appears, conclusively, that this 
                                                          
86 Louisiana Democrat, September 26, 1866. 
87 South-western, August 15, 1866. 
88 South-western, August 15, 1866. 
89 Summers, A Dangerous Stir, 130. 
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riot was, with full knowledge of the consequences, originally planned under the 
supervision, and with the cognizance and connivance, if not at the instigation, of the 
radical leaders in congress; that it was an open and flagrant attempt, in violation of all 
law, and in defiance of an overwhelming adverse public opinion, to inaugurate a political 
revolution, and a premeditated and deliberately planned effort to execute an unlawful 
purpose…”90 Despite these allegations, the official investigation into the riot later 
dispelled the notion that the riot originated with Republican leaders in Congress.91 
 In reporting the rumor of a grand radical plot, Democratic papers attempted to 
maintain hold of political power in their communities. Desperate to defend the South’s 
conservatives against northern Republican backlash in the wake of the massacre, southern 
editors depicted the New Orleans Riot as part of a premeditated Radical Republican 
conspiracy to subvert the state and federal governments. The conservatives, instructed to 
“act with harmony, and act with vigor” in the impending revolution, stood in stark 
contrast to the volatile Republicans.92 Despite conservatives’ best efforts to accrue 
political capital in favor of the Democratic Party after the riot, the New Orleans Massacre 
played a crucial role in undermining Johnsonian Reconstruction and aiding the 
Republican cause.93  
 
  
                                                          
90 South-western, August 22, 1866. 
91 The Select Committee on the New Orleans Riots stated of Johnson’s charge, “Congress was not in 
session at the time of the massacre. Its members were at their respective homes, and the committee fail to 
discover any grounds upon which so grave a charge should be made. It was an unwarranted and unjust 
expression of hostile feeling, without pretext or foundation in fact.” Select Committee, Report of the 
Select Committee on the New Orleans Riots, 25. 
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V. Conclusion 
 In the weeks after the New Orleans Massacre, reports of insurrections and rumors 
of violence persisted across Louisiana, from Shreveport to Alexandria and Opelousas. 
Newspapers offered stories of mob activity, chaotic insurrections, and senseless violence, 
occurring within the state and in other regions of the South. As depicted in the headlines 
of Louisiana papers, the social atmosphere of the South was unstable, and the future of 
the region was clouded by the fear that Radical Republicans intended to ignite a political 
revolution across the South. 
Though the rise of telegraphic news aided the rapid spread of information, it also 
enabled the pervasive circulation of misinformation. Such misinformation, in the form of 
rumors, gossip, and paranoia, contributed to the social volatility of Louisiana in the wake 
of the riot. Newspapers were capable of shaping public sentiment about the New Orleans 
Massacre and the reconvened constitutional convention, and readers were unable to 
definitively separate fact from fiction. 
In the aftermath of the New Orleans Riot, conservative newspapers spread 
paranoia to maintain some semblance of authority in light of the looming threat of 
Republican leadership. The conservative papers did not serve as “hidden” transcripts for 
contending for power; rather, they were blatant, overt ways of distorting public 
perception in order to uphold Democratic power in the face of a radicalized political 
environment. The menace of Radical Republicanism appeared real to conservative 
editors, and publishing elaborate radical conspiracies, distorting the number of fatalities, 
and spreading rumors of instability seemed viable outlets for changing public opinion in 
favor of the Democratic Party.  
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Despite conservative editors’ numerous attempts, these efforts failed at increasing 
Democratic popularity and provided fuel for northern Republicans, who accused southern 
whites of committing countless atrocities against the black freedmen of Louisiana. The 
New Orleans Massacre ultimately undermined Andrew Johnson’s Reconstruction policy, 
and in 1868, the Radical Republicans gained enough political momentum to mandate 
universal male suffrage as a condition for readmission to the Union.94 When Louisiana 
adopted a new constitution in April 1868, the members of the convention finally gained 
what they had sacrificed their lives to achieve: the right to vote and hold office. 
 
  
                                                          
94 Hollandsworth, 148-149. 
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